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Abstract It has been suggested that attenuated adaptation
to visual stimuli in autism is the result of atypical per-
ceptual priors (e.g., Pellicano and Burr in Trends Cogn Sci
16(10):504–510, 2012. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.009).
This study investigated adaptation to color in autistic
adults, measuring both strength of afterimage and the
influence of top-down knowledge. We found no difference
in color afterimage strength between autistic and typical
adults. Effects of top-down knowledge on afterimage
intensity shown by Lupyan (Acta Psychol 161:117–130,
2015. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.08.006) were not repli-
cated for either group. This study finds intact color adap-
tation in autistic adults. This is in contrast to findings of
attenuated adaptation to faces and numerosity in autistic
children. Future research should investigate the possibility
of developmental differences in adaptation and further
examine top-down effects on adaptation.
Keywords Autism  Afterimages  Adaptation  Color 
Top-down knowledge
Introduction
Autism is characterized by difficulties in social communi-
cation and behavioral traits including rigid patterns of
behavior, preference for sameness, and intense and
restricted interests (American Psychiatric Association
2013). Sensory symptoms, including both hyper-reactivity
and hypo-reactivity to external stimuli, atypicalities in
sensory processing and unusual sensory interests are now
included in the most recent revision of the diagnostic cri-
teria for autism (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) (American Psy-
chiatric Association 2013). This inclusion implies that they
are part of the core of autism, with such atypical sensory
experiences potentially also being related to other key
features of the condition (Pellicano 2013).
There has been a recent influx of hypotheses attempting
to account for these sensory and perceptual differences in
particular. Bayesian accounts of perception propose that
information from sensory input is combined with prior
knowledge or experience to facilitate the interpretation of
the sensory information (e.g. Knill and Pouget 2004;
Kersten et al. 2004). Pellicano and Burr’s (2012) hypo-
priors account posits, within a Bayesian framework, that an
under-weighting (relative to typical individuals) of the
strength of prior information when interpreting sensory
information may underlie autistic sensation and perception.
Building on this work, others have proposed accounts of
atypical (rather than simply reduced) priors in autism (e.g.,
Hellendoorn et al. 2015), and predictive coding accounts of
autistic perception (Friston et al. 2013; Lawson et al. 2014;
Sinha et al. 2014; Van de Cruys et al. 2013).
One sensory process that could be affected by under-
weighting of prior information is adaptation (Pellicano and
Burr 2012). Adaptation is a fundamental property of neural
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networks and describes changes in neural activity in
response to a persistent stimulus (Kohn 2007). Adaptation
is thought to serve a crucial function for sensory systems,
tuning neural responses to maximize sensitivity to the
range of stimuli present in the immediate environment (e.g.
Webster 2011). Adaptation to visual stimuli can result in
the experience of aftereffects—distortions in perception
which tend to bias perception in the opposite direction to
that adapted (e.g. adaptation to a grating tilted to the left,
causes a vertical grating to appear tilted slightly to the right
(Clifford 2012). Since adaptation afterimages are directly
related to the recent sensory input of the beholder, whereby
prior sensory experiences are used to calibrate sensory
systems and hence bias current perception, adaptation
afterimages should therefore be attenuated in autism (Pel-
licano and Burr 2012).
Several studies have found differences in adaptation
aftereffects in autism. Research on high-level face identity
aftereffects has shown that they are weaker in autistic
compared to typical children (Ewing et al. 2013a; Rhodes
et al. 2014), and that the strength of the aftereffect corre-
lates significantly with autistic features, such that those
with greater degrees of autistic features have the smallest
aftereffects (Pellicano et al. 2007). Subsequent work has
shown that adaptation is diminished in autistic children for
facial configuration (Ewing et al. 2013b), facial emotion
(Rutherford et al. 2012) and eye-gaze direction (Pellicano
et al. 2013). There is also evidence for slightly reduced face
identity aftereffects in parents (and siblings) of autistic
children, suggesting that reduced adaptation may be a
feature of the broad endophenotype of autism (Fiorentini
et al. 2012). Two studies involving autistic adults, rather
than children, have failed to find evidence of reduced
adaptation to facial identity and emotion (Cook et al. 2014)
and figural contraction/expansion (Walsh et al. 2015),
indicating that the differences apparent in childhood may
reflect a developmental delay rather than a deficit as such.
More recent work has attempted to determine the perva-
siveness of reduced adaptation in autism by examining the
nature of the incoming information. In one study, Karaminis
et al. (2015) reported that autistic children showed similar
levels of adaptation to perceptual causality as typical chil-
dren. This effect potentially operates at a lower level of the
visual hierarchy leading some authors (Turi et al. 2015) to
argue that diminished adaptation in autistic people might be
confined to high-level stimulus attributes. In support of this
claim, Turi et al. showed that autistic children (aged
7–14 years) exhibit less adaptation to numerosity (i.e.
number of items present in a part of visual field) than age- and
ability-matched typically developing children.
Together, these results are intriguing but further exam-
ination of the nature and extent of diminished adaptation in
autistic individuals is warranted. Here, we address two key
questions—first, do claims for attenuated adaptation in
autism generalize beyond face perception to other
domains? And, second, do claims for attenuated adaptation
in autism generalize from childhood to adulthood? We
investigate these issues with regards to adaptation to a low-
level visual attribute, color.
Adaptation to color can be demonstrated by the phe-
nomenon of color afterimages—an observer who stares at a
colored patch for a few seconds will experience an afterim-
age of the patch in the opponent color (e.g. afterimage of
lime-green following adaptation to magenta) if they look at a
uniform white field (Wheatstone 1838). The locus of adap-
tation which causes color afterimages has been the subject of
discussion, and the current evidence suggests that color
afterimages are instantiated by adaptation of photoreceptors
in the retina and retinal ganglion cells, but may then be
subject to further modulation by cortical processes (Zaidi
et al. 2012). For example, if an observer is alternately shown
a vertical grating on a red background and a horizontal
grating on a green background for around 2 min they will
subsequently perceive a reddish tinge to a horizontal grating
on a white background, and a greenish tinge on a vertical
grating on a white background (McCollough 1965). This is
known as the McCollough effect, and is most likely mediated
by processes in early visual cortex (area V1; Vul and
MacLeod 2006), not just at the level of the retina.
The primary aim of the current study was to investigate
whether color adaptation is reduced in autistic individuals, as
has been shown previously for faces and numerosity. There
is already evidence that autistic children differ from their
typically developing peers in both color discrimination and
memory, at least under some conditions (Cranwell et al.
2015; Franklin et al. 2008; Fujita et al. 2011; Heaton et al.
2008; but see also Koh et al. 2010). There is also anecdotal
and case study evidence for enhanced color associations
(both phobias and intense interests) in autism (Ludlow et al.
2014) and hyper-sensitivity to certain colors, ambient
lighting and colored patterns (Robertson and Simmons
2015). Together these studies suggest that various aspects of
color vision and cognition may be different in autistic people.
Color adaptation, however, has not been the subject of any
studies of autistic perception published to date.
If perception in autism is associated with a generalized
reduction in adaptation– as the hypo-priors account pre-
dicts—then we would expect to find weaker afterimages
for autistic participants compared to typical participants. It
is important to note, however, that the initial neural locus
of color afterimages is the retina (Zaidi et al. 2012),
whereas the prior evidence for attenuated adaptation in
autism has all been for higher-level stimuli (faces,
numerosity) which are represented in cortical areas (Kan-
wisher et al. 1997; Piazza and Izard 2009). However, there
also is some limited evidence for an association between
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autism and different patterns of activity in the retina from a
study of flash electro-retinogram (ERG) (Ritvo et al. 1988).
This study found that rod and cone activity was reduced in
13 out of 27 autistic participants and additional intellectual
disabilities, relative to age- and sex-matched typical indi-
viduals. Therefore, differences in the basic overall amount
of color adaptation in autism may also be predicted on the
basis of differential function at the retinal level.
A secondary aim of this study was to investigate whe-
ther effects of top-down knowledge on color afterimages is
reduced in autism. Lupyan (2015) has claimed that color
adaptation is subject to influences from top-down knowl-
edge of a scene or object’s typical color, using a task based
on the ‘Spanish Castle Illusion’ (e.g., Sadowski 2006). The
‘Spanish Castle Illusion’ is a color adaptation illusion
where exposure to a highly-saturated adapting image, in the
complementary colors to the original, causes the observer
to see a subsequent greyscale image in the original colors
(albeit desaturated). The effect is most striking when the
adapting and greyscale image are created from a pho-
tograph of a landmark or natural scene. The version which
gave the illusion its name used an image of the castle of
Manzanares el Real in Spain, which included the castle,
with a clear sky forming most of the background, and
vegetation in the foreground (see Sadowski 2006). The
adapting image is formed by inverting the colors of the
base image, flattening the luminance profile and boosting
the saturation of the resulting ‘‘negative’’ image. After a
short period of fixation (e.g. 20 s), the adapting image is
replaced by a greyscale version of the original. The
superimposition of the color afterimages with the greyscale
contours of the image results in the percept of an image
presented in the full, original color (Daw 1962)—an effect
which is also observed in illusions of ‘‘filling-in’’ of color
afterimages when coupled with luminance contours (e.g.
Anstis et al. 2012; Powell et al. 2012; van Lier et al. 2009).
Using a nulling method, whereby participants were asked
to adjust the image until it appeared greyscale following
adaptation, to measure the strength of the afterimage, Lup-
yan (2015) found that afterimages were stronger for images
of natural scenes (which have typical colors) compared to
images of man-made objects (which might be any color). Yet
when the same images were turned upside-down in order to
disrupt the ease with which the image content could be
extracted, the difference between the natural and man-made
scenes was abolished. This effect of image orientation on the
natural scenes cannot be accounted for by low-level differ-
ences in the stimuli used, since it is the same image, rotated
through 180 degrees. Lupyan attributed this interaction
between image orientation and content as being reflective of
top-down influence on the perception of the afterimage—
scenes with color-diagnostic content (i.e. typically contain-
ing particular colors) are subject to modulation by color
knowledge, whereas scenes with non-color-diagnostic con-
tent receive no top-down influence. Turning a diagnostic
image upside-down disrupts the mechanism responsible for
predicting the scene colors, and thus diminishes the effect of
color knowledge on the afterimage.
We sought to replicate Lupyan’s (2015) study with
samples of autistic and non-autistic adults. We also
attempted to improve on Lupyan’s methods by using the
two original stimulus images (Experiments 2A–E), in
addition to two new images with color-diagnostic and non-
color-diagnostic content. Furthermore, we used a percep-
tually-valid, display-independent stimulus space to mea-
sure the strength of afterimages. This paradigm provides an
additional exploration of the hypo-priors account of autism,
since the effect of top-down knowledge modulating the
appearance of afterimages requires the application of priors
to predict the appearance of the color-diagnostic scenes.
The hypo-priors account would therefore predict that the
interaction of image content (i.e. the color-diagnosticity of
man-made vs. natural scenes) with image orientation
should be weaker, in autistic individuals.
We used the nulling method as described by Lupyan
(2015) to investigate two hypotheses related to the hypo-
priors account of autism (Pellicano and Burr 2012) and
other predictive coding accounts (Friston et al. 2013;
Lawson et al. 2014; Sinha et al. 2014; Van de Cruys et al.
2013). This method provides a basic measure of adaptation
in addition to potentially allowing the detection of top-
down effects on adaptation. The primary hypothesis was
that afterimages would be weaker in autistic adults,
reflecting attenuated adaptation to visual stimuli. The sec-
ondary hypothesis was that autism would be associated
with reduced top-down effects on afterimage magnitude.
Methods
Participants
Sixteen adults (8 male) diagnosed with an autism spectrum
condition took part, recruited through two local autism
charities. All adults had received an independent clinical
diagnosis of autism (n = 7) or Asperger’s syndrome
(n = 9) according to ICD-10 (World Health Organization
1992) or DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association 2013)
criteria. For inclusion in the data analysis participants also
had to exceed threshold for autism on the self-report Social
Responsiveness Scale-2nd edition (SRS-2) (T-score C 60)
(Constantino and Gruber 2012) or the Adult Autism Quo-
tient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) (score C 30, a
threshold shown to correspond to a high degree of speci-
ficity (i.e. low false-positive rate) and sensitivity (i.e. high
hit-rate) (Woodbury-Smith et al. 2005)). Two participants
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(both male) failed to meet threshold for autism on either
questionnaire and were therefore excluded from analysis.
Participants were also screened for IQ as an index of their
cognitive functioning. One male participant was excluded
both due to a low-average full-scale IQ score (of 72) on the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence-Second Edi-
tion (WASI-II; Wechsler and Psychological Corporation
2011) and for failure to follow the task instructions, another
male participant gave responses consistent with a color
vision deficiency on the Ishihara test (Ishihara 1973) and
was excluded, as was another female participant who did
not follow the task instructions. A final sample of 11 adults
(4 male) formed the autism group. The gender ratio in this
sample is unusual, given the male preponderance in diag-
nosed cases of autism.
Sixteen typical adults were recruited from community
contacts. Data from two participants were removed as they
scored over 60 on the SRS-2. Three further participants
were excluded for matching purposes, yielding a final
sample of 11 typical adults (4 male). The final groups of
typical and autistic participants were well-matched at the
group level in terms of gender proportion, mean age and
mean IQ, but, as expected, differed significantly on mean
SRS-2 and mean AQ score (see Table 1).
All 22 participants reported normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity and were assessed as having normal
color vision using Ishihara plates (Ishihara 1973) and the
Lanthony tritan test (Lanthony 1998). Participants were
paid standard rates of £7.50 per hour. All procedures per-
formed in studies involving human participants were in
accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional
and/or national research committee and with the 1964
Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or compa-
rable ethical standards. The research protocol was
approved by the University of Sussex Sciences and Tech-
nology Cross-School Research Ethics Committee (approval
reference ER/JJM29/3) and all participants gave written
informed consent prior to participation in this study.
Stimuli
Four photographs were used as the basis for all stimuli
presented in the experiment. Each photograph depicted one
of the following four scenes: books on shelves (‘‘books’’);
Culzean Castle in Scotland (‘‘castle’’); Bells beach, Aus-
tralia (‘‘beach’’); and a row of painted, wooden beach huts
in Whitby, England (‘‘huts’’). The books (color non-diag-
nostic) and castle (color diagnostic) images were identical
to those used by Lupyan while the huts and beach pho-
tographs were selected as good examples of images which
are color-diagnostic (beach) or color non-diagnostic (huts)1
(see Oliva and Schyns 2000) (Fig. 1).
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
and group comparisons for age,
IQ, AQ and SRS-2 for autistic
and typical adults
Measure Group Group difference
Autistic adults Typical adults t test Cohen’s da
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range
Age in years 24.8 (4.9) 19–34 23.9 (4.8) 19–33 t(20) = 0.44, p = 0.668 0.20
Full-scale IQb 108.6 (12.6) 82–133 109.6 (8.1) 95–121 t(20) = 0.22, p = 0.827 0.10
VCIc 104.2 (12.3) 84–126 109.0 (12.7) 91–132 t(20) = 0.89, p = 0.385 0.40
PRId 111.7 (13.8) 91–132 107.9 (8.3) 92–121 t(20) = 0.79, p = 0.441 0.35
AQe 37.7 (5.9) 29–49 15.0 (5.4) 7–23 t(20) = 9.45, p\ 0.001 4.23
SRS-2f 78.0 (6.9) 68–90 49.9 (9.4) 26–60 t(20) = 8.00, p\ 0.001 3.58
a Cohen’s d computed from t test results, as recommended by Kover and Atwood (2013) for matched-
group designs
b IQ = Intelligence Quotient, as measured by the four sub-tests of Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intel-
ligence-II (WASI-II; Wechsler and Psychological Corporation 2011)
c VCI = Verbal Comprehension Index, verbal sub-scale of WASI-II
d PRI = Perceptual Reasoning Index, non-verbal sub-scale of WASI-II
e AQ = Adult Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001)
f SRS-2 = Adult Social Responsiveness Scale-2nd edition (Constantino and Gruber 2012). This table re-
ports standardized (age-adjusted) scores on the full-scale IQ, PRI, VCI and SRS-2; the statistical inferences
about the differences between the groups are the same for raw scores
1 To confirm that the stimuli were appropriately classified as color-
diagnostic, an informal survey was carried out in which naive typical
observers were shown original and inverse-colour versions of stimuli
from the experiment, one at a time, and asked ‘‘is this image presented
in original or altered colors?’’ Observers did not see both the original
and inverted versions of the same base image. The results from 8
observers (two male; mean age 32 years) confirmed that the original
castle and beach scenes were always correctly categorised as
unaltered (and the inverse versions always categorised as altered),
indicating the diagnostic nature of the colour of those scenes. The
books and huts images were more ambiguous.
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The adapting stimuli were generated following the Adobe
Photoshop actions described in John Sadowski’s online
demonstration of the Spanish Castle illusion (Sadowski
2006). The procedure involves the flattening of the lumi-
nance profile of the image, inverting the colors in HSL space
and enhancing the color intensity of the resulting image.
These adapting images are not equated in color saturation, so
the image orientation manipulation is used to disentangle the
effect of the image content from low-level differences in the
adapting stimuli. Since the rotation through 180 degrees does
not change the low-level properties of the image, if afteref-
fects are solely determined by the intensity of the colors in
the adapting image, one would expect orientation to have no
effect on the magnitude of the aftereffect. In contrast, if the
afterimage magnitude is affected by top-down knowledge
this may be disrupted by rotation (Lupyan 2015). Therefore,
the orientation manipulation provides a control for differ-
ences in the low-level properties of the adapting images, and
allows for the detection of purported top-down effects on
afterimage strength. Inverted and greyscale versions of each
original image were also generated using the hue rotation and
desaturate functions of Photoshop in HSL-mode. For each of
the four basic images, a smooth continuum consisting of 51
images between the original, ‘‘positive’’ image, through the
greyscale image and to the inverted ‘‘negative’’ image were
created through linear transformation of the RGB values for
each pixel.2 This continuum was the basis for the adjustment
phase of each trial. It is important to note that this stimulus
space is arbitrary and does not necessarily represent homo-
geneous or equal steps in terms of perceptual difference.
Comparisons across images (e.g., comparing books to castle)
in terms of these raw units should therefore be avoided,
particularly as there is some variation in the perceptual size
of steps across images. Figure 2 illustrates this variation—
the relationship between the adjustment scale and mean
saturation of the image is linear, but there is a small amount
of variation in the perceptual difference that each step rep-
resents across images (see the differences in slope). The
mean (SD) step size in CIE chroma units for each image was
as follows: castle—2.40 (0.36); books—1.45 (0.19);
beach—2.25 (0.27); huts—1.81 (0.45). To address the issue
of non-comparable units on the adjustment scale, after the
experiment, the continuum images were subsequently re-
coded according to their difference from greyscale using CIE
chroma, a perceptual color space—this is further explained
in the results section. Further details of the colormetric
properties of the stimulus images are given in Table 2.
Throughout the experiment, a background grey with chro-
maticity equivalent to D65 (CIE (1931) xyY = 0.313, 0.329,
20) was used.
These images (in all colored and achromatic forms)
were always presented centrally on the monitor with a
fixation cross in the center. All images subtended 25 of
visual angle horizontally and 17 (24 for the books image)
of visual angle vertically, and were presented on a grey
background. The background subtended 39 of visual angle
horizontally and 29 of visual angle vertically.
Apparatus
The adaptation tasks were completed on a 22-inch Mit-
subishi DiamondPlus 2070SB Diamondtron CRT monitor,
with a resolution of 1600 9 1200 pixels, 24-bit color res-
olution, and a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Participants made
their responses using the appropriate keyboard press.
A ColorCal colorimeter (Cambridge Research Systems)
Fig. 1 Images used in the experiment. At the adjustment phase a
continuum of 51 images of gradually changing color intensity
between the positive, greyscale and negative images was available for
selection. The dimensions of the images varied slightly due to the
proportions of the source images
2 All of the stimulus images, including original, negative, adapting
and all 51 steps of the adjustment continuum are available from the
authors, on request.
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was used to measure the monitor and calibrate the primary
values (RGB) for the background color regularly during the
data collection period. The tasks took place in a blacked-
out room, with the monitor as the only source of light. A
cardboard viewing tunnel lined with black felt was used to
eliminate effect of peripheral objects and colors and a chin
rest was used to constrain viewing distance at 57 cm,
ensuring consistency of the perceived size of the images
and overlap of the after-images with adjustment image.
Design
The experiment involved two versions of an adaptation task,
both identical in procedure, length and task, but with dif-
ferent images in each. Version A included the books and
castle images and version B the huts and beach images. Each
version had two images—one color diagnostic (castle/
beach) and one color non-diagnostic (books/huts). In each
version one image would be presented upright (hereafter
referred to as ‘‘up’’), and the other upside-down (hereafter
‘‘down’’). This diagnosticity-orientation pairing was
reversed in the second version (e.g. version A—castle up,
books down; version B—huts down, beach up). Thus, each
participant would adapt to color-diagnostic scenes in both
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Fig. 2 Mean difference in whole-image chroma from the greyscale
image (0 on the x-axis), for the adjustment steps for each stimulus
image. Although the adjustment scale included 51 steps from -25 to
?25, the actual range of settings chosen by observers was -21 to ?3,
and 95 % of trials the setting chosen was in the range -20 to 0
Table 2 Colorimetric
properties of the original
(positive), inverted (negative),
and adapting images used in the
study
Image Mean CIE (1931) Y (range) Mean CIE chroma (range)
Positive image Castle 17.43
(0.00–62.19)
66.71
(0.00–191.38)
Books 15.76
(0.00–61.60)
37.69
(0.00–244.01)
Beach 19.32
(0.00–62.19)
52.05
(0.00–116.55)
Huts 22.31
(0.02–62.19)
59.39
(0.15–135.64)
Negative image Castle 17.62
(0.00–62.19)
60.19
(0.00–172.99)
Books 16.05
(0.00–61.49)
41.72
(0.00–173.72)
Beach 19.47
(0.00–62.19)
58.73
(0.00–156.65)
Huts 22.27
(0.06–62.19)
45.82
(0.13–164.44)
Adapting image Castle 9.46
(7.91–14.59)
81.44
(0.73–244.02)
Books 9.40
(8.21–16.46)
61.37
(0.80–217.62)
Beach 9.78
(7.60–18.72)
73.44
(0.73–152.59)
Huts 9.39
(7.18–17.84)
50.58
(0.73–148.95)
All values are a summary of all pixels in each image. CIE—International Commission on Illumination;
Y—luminance in cd/m3. In most images the range of pixels includes some white and some black pixels,
therefore the range of Y and chroma is fixed at the limits of the monitor used. For the adapting images,
however, part of the process to create them involved a flattening of the luminance profile, meaning that
these images have a more restricted range of luminance
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orientations and color non-diagnostic scenes in both orien-
tations. The order in which the participant completed the
versions (A/B) was also counterbalanced across participants.
For the purpose of analysis the trials were classified
according to the class of the image (i.e. books and huts are
‘‘non-diagnostic’’ and castle and beach are ‘‘diagnostic’’)
and orientation (upright or upside down), such that, across
both versions of the adaptation nulling experiment, each
participant provided settings for four conditions—diagnostic
upright, diagnostic upside-down, non-diagnostic upright and
non-diagnostic upside down. The specific image used in each
condition varied between participants (e.g. for some the
diagnostic upright image was the castle but for others it was
the beach) but was counterbalanced across groups.
Procedure
Participants were seen individually at the university either
for a single session lasting approximately 2 h or for two
shorter sessions. Within the session, the participant com-
pleted one experimental task followed by the two ques-
tionnaires tapping autism symptomatology (the AQ and
SRS-2) and the WASI-II, followed by the second experi-
mental task.
Prior to beginning the task proper, participants were
briefed with instruction sheets explaining the trial proce-
dure and the participant’s task. These instructions encour-
aged the participants to try to ‘make their adjustments as
quickly and accurately’ as they could and emphasized the
importance of maintaining a steady gaze, fixed on the
central cross.
To begin, participants completed eight ‘norming’ trials,
in which there was no adaptation phase, only adjustment to
greyscale (trials started at a random point on the positive–
negative color continuum). Four norming trials for each
stimulus image were completed, with the image only dis-
played in the orientation it would be presented in for the
adaptation trials. Norming was carried out for each image
that would be subsequently presented in the adaptation
trials. This was ostensibly for practice, allowing partici-
pants to become accustomed to the adjustment procedure
and range of stimuli, but also allowed recording of the pre-
adaptation settings for each image and observer (following
Lupyan 2015).
Next, participants were presented with version A or B of
the experimental task. Each experimental trial required
participants to stare at a fixation cross in the center of an
adapting (color) image for 20 s, which was immediately
replaced by a greyscale version of the same image in the
same orientation. A nulling procedure was used to measure
the strength of the afterimage in terms of the shift in per-
ception of this greyscale image towards the positive (nat-
ural) colors of the photograph. The participant was
instructed to adjust the image until it appeared subjectively
greyscale. This was done using the up and down arrow
keys on the keyboard, which were assigned at random on
each trial to either adjust the image towards the positive-
color image or the negative-color image along the adjust-
ment continuum. When the participant felt the image was
greyscale they pressed the space bar. Participants were
given 30 s between each trial to allow for the dissipation of
the color aftereffects.
Each version consisted of eight adaptation trials (four
for each of two images, of which one image would be
upright and one upside down) presented in a pseudo-ran-
dom order, with the constraint that trials presenting the
same image could only appear a maximum of two times in
succession. After having completed one version of the task
(version A or version B), participants filled in the AQ and
SRS-2 self-report questionnaires, then completed the sec-
ond version. The order of versions was counter-balanced
across participants.
Results
Settings were coded initially by an index number that
referred to the selected image from the adjustment con-
tinuum. However, in order to compare across images it was
important to approximate the perceptual equivalence of
these indices. The CIE L*u*v* color space is a perceptu-
ally-uniform description of the colors visible to adult
human observers. It includes parameters that approximate
to saturation or chromatic intensity called ‘‘chroma’’, as
well as hue and lightness. Stronger afterimages require
more intense chromatic input to null them. The chroma of
each image selected in the experiment to null the afteref-
fect was subtracted from the chroma of the presented
greyscale image that was in the center of the adjustment
continuum. This was calculated first for each pixel and then
this difference was averaged across the whole image to
provide the mean chroma difference from grey for each
image. Trials where the selected image was in the opposite
direction to that expected given the adaptation image (i.e.
towards the positive image) were given a negative chroma
score. This allowed us to compare different images using a
perceptually meaningful measure. Higher chroma differ-
ence scores indicate that more intensely-colored images
were selected to null the afterimage, indicating that the
afterimage was stronger in that trial or condition.
The pre-adaptation settings were first analyzed for group
differences (to make sure both groups could set to grey-
scale) and to confirm that pre-adaptation subjective grey-
scale points had mean CIE chroma no different from zero.
A 2 (image type: diagnostic/non-diagnostic) 9 2 (orienta-
tion: upright/upside-down) 9 2 (group: autism/typical)
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mixed ANOVA was run on the pre-adaptation chroma
settings. There was a marginal, but non-significant main
effect of image type (F(1,20) = 4.13, p = 0.056,
r = 0.41), and a marginal, but non-significant interaction
of orientation with image type (F(1,20) = 4.35, p = 0.050,
r = 0.42). One-sample t tests indicated that the mean
chroma of images selected as appearing subjectively
greyscale in the pre-adaptation settings did not deviate
significantly from zero in any of the four conditions (nat-
ural up, man-made up, natural down, man-made down)
(largest t = 1.75, smallest p = 0.095). There were no other
significant main effects or interactions. There was no effect
of autism on the achromatic settings (F(1,20) = 1.40,
p = 0.250, r = 0.26). Therefore both groups were equally
able to set the images to greyscale, and there was no dif-
ference in the settings across image type and orientation.
Following Lupyan’s finding, we predicted that afterim-
ages would be stronger (i.e. require more nulling) for diag-
nostic than non-diagnostic scenes, but only in the upright
condition. We also predicted that that the effect of color
diagnosticity on afterimage strength would be absent or
attenuated in autistic adults compared to typical adults.
Finally, if adaptation is generally reduced in autism, after-
images should be generally weaker across all conditions.
A preliminary analysis confirmed that the settings for each
diagnosticity and orientation were consistent across the
different images (largest t = 0.97, smallest p = 0.343),
allowing us to collapse across diagnostic (castle and beach)
and non-diagnostic (books and huts). Mean chroma differ-
ences were submitted to a 2 (image type: diagnostic/non-
diagnostic) 9 2 (orientation: upright/upside-down) 9 2
(group: autism/typical) mixed ANOVA. The only significant
effect was a main effect of image type (F(1,20) = 29.25,
p\ 0.001, r = 0.77). A follow-up t test on diagnostic and
non-diagnostic images (collapsed across orientation and
group) found that nulling settings were significantly more
chromatic for diagnostic (M = 12.18, SEM = 1.67) than
non-diagnostic images (M = 7.09, SEM = 1.26; t(21) =
5.53, p\ 0.001, r = 0.77). Unexpectedly, there was neither
a main effect of orientation (F(1,20) = 1.95, p = 0.178,
r = 0.30) nor a main effect of group (F(1,20) = 0.08,
p = 0.781, r = 0.06). There were also no significant inter-
actions of orientation with image type (F(1,20) = 1.53,
p = 0.231, r = 0.27), orientation with group (F(1,20) =
0.50, p = 0.489, r = 0.16), image type with group
(F(1,20) = 0.06, p = 0.811, r = 0.05), and no three-way
interaction (F(1,20) = 0.02, p = 0.905, r = 0.03) (Fig. 3).3
Bayesian statistics allow inferences to be made about the
null, in addition to the alternative, hypothesis. A Bayesian
approach was used to assess the strength of the evidence
[i.e. the probability of the null hypothesis being true, given
the data, p(H0|D); or the probability of the alternative
hypothesis being true, given the data, p(H0|D)] for the
crucial three main effects (orientation, image type and
group) and the image type 9 orientation interaction. This
was based on calculating the Bayesian information crite-
rion (BIC) following the methods and materials provided
by Masson (2011). The effect of image type returned a
very high BIC value (DBIC = -16.74) indicating very
strong support for the alternative hypothesis (p(H1|D)[
0.999). Support for the null over the alternative hypothesis
was observed for the main effect of orientation
(DBIC = 1.05, p(H0|D) = 0.628) and for the interaction
between orientation and image type (DBIC = 2.09,
p(H0|D) = 0.676). Probabilities below 0.75 indicate
‘weak’ support for the null hypothesis in these cases
(Raftery 1999), whereas the main effect of group offers
stronger support, with a Bayes factor above 3 (Dienes
2011) and ‘positive’ support for the null (Raftery 1999)
(DBIC = 3.00, p(H0|D) = 0.818).
One important factor which affects the magnitude of
aftereffects is time since the offset of the adapting stimulus.
Afterimages fade with time, so the magnitude recorded in
this study is directly related to the time spent adjusting
each image. Accordingly, participant mean reaction times
(RTs) showed a strong negative correlation with mean
afterimage magnitude (r(20) = -0.53, p = 0.01), indicat-
ing that those who took longer to make their adjustments
tended to report weaker afterimages. Participants’ RTs
were submitted to a 2 (image type: diagnostic/non-
diagnostic) 9 2 (orientation: upright/upside-down) 9 2
(group: autism/typical) mixed ANOVA (as was carried out
for the aftereffect magnitude data). This analysis revealed
no significant main effects or interactions (largest
F = 2.88, smallest p = 0.105—image type), indicating
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Fig. 3 Mean whole-image chroma settings for nulling afterimages
following adaptation (in CIE chroma units). The diagnostic images
were of a castle and beach, while the non-diagnostic were of books
and painted huts. Error bars show ±1 SEM
3 We also performed an additional analysis with task order entered as
a factor. We found no main effect of task order or interaction with
other factors (all ps[ 0.320).
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that RTs were consistent across conditions and groups
(overall mean RT = 6.34 s).
Discussion
Intact Adaptation to Color in Autistic Adults
The primary aim of the present study was to investigate
whether color adaptation is reduced in autistic adults.
Evidence for attenuated adaptation to faces (Ewing et al.
2013a, b; Fiorentini et al. 2012; Pellicano et al. 2013;
Rhodes et al. 2014) and number (Turi et al. 2015) in
autistic children may reflect a generalized reduction in
adaptation in autism, as the hypo-priors account of autism
(Pellicano 2013; Pellicano and Burr 2012) would predict.
Contrary to predictions, there were no significant group
differences observed in the strength of color afterimages
following adaptation to whole-scene images in our sample
of autistic adults, relative to a group of typical adults.
There are a number of implications of this finding,
relating to the understanding of perceptual atypicalities in
autism, and the interpretation of this study’s results. First,
the results of the Bayesian analysis shows that the present
study provides positive support for the null hypothesis
(Dienes 2011; Raftery 1999) in relation to the effect of
autism on basic adaptation magnitude. Similarly, the effect
size associated with the group factor is very small, indi-
cating a high degree of overlap in the distributions of
adaptation strength across the autistic and typical groups.
Therefore, we are confident that these findings are reliable.
Second, the basic phenomenon of color afterimages is
attributable to adaptation very early on in the visual stream,
at the level of photoreceptors and ganglion cells in the
retina (Zaidi et al. 2012), whereas the effects of luminance
contours which help to make the Spanish Castle effect so
vivid reflect the contribution of areas of visual cortex
modifying the afterimage signal received from the retina to
create the perception of filling-in (Anstis et al. 2012; van
Lier et al. 2009; Vergeer et al. 2015). In contrast, previous
demonstrations of attenuated adaptation in autism have
been for faces and number, which are processed at a higher
level, in regions of the temporal (i.e., fusiform face area—
Kanwisher et al. 1997) and parietal cortex (see Piazza and
Izard 2009, for a review), respectively. In the current study,
no general reduction in afterimage strength was observed
in the autistic relative to the typical group. This may sug-
gest that only higher-level adaptation is attenuated in aut-
ism, where priors and top-down influence may have more
impact on perception, whilst low-level visual adaptation
mechanisms in autistic adults are intact.
Third, the present study has tested autistic adults,
while the majority of previous work demonstrating
attenuated adaptation has been in children. For example,
whilst children on the autism spectrum may have atypical
adaptation aftereffects for facial identity and expression
(Ewing et al. 2013b; Rhodes et al. 2014), afterimages in
autistic adults are no different in strength to those of
typical adults (Cook et al. 2014; Walsh et al. 2015).
These latter results are, however, at odds with the finding
that the parents of autistic children also exhibit reduced
face aftereffects (Fiorentini et al. 2012), suggesting that
attenuated adaptation of certain stimuli may also be
reduced in genetically-related family members, and is
manifest even in typical adults. It is important to note
that while Fiorentini et al. found that the effect gener-
alizes to adults who are relatives of autistic children, the
effect is small. The evidence for reduced adaptation to
numerosity (Turi et al. 2015) is also restricted to autistic
children, with no similar study published on autistic
adults.
There are relatively few studies which have examined
adaptation in autistic adults. It remains possible that color
adaptation is atypical in autistic children, even if not
attenuated in adulthood. Children have a more limited
experience of the world than adults and may not yet have
developed compensatory strategies for any perceptual
atypicality they experience. Indeed, some studies of typi-
cally developing children have found differences between
children and adults in afterimages of facial identity and
attractiveness, under some conditions (e.g., Hills et al.
2010; Jeffery et al. 2010, 2011). These studies suggest that
children have more flexible norm-based coding of faces,
due to their more limited experience of the world (see
Jeffery and Rhodes 2011 for a review). Other studies have
found afterimage magnitude is comparable between adults
and children for face aftereffects (Anzures et al. 2009;
Nishimura et al. 2008, 2011; Pimperton et al. 2009). The
effect of age on color afterimages has not been widely
researched. There is a suggestion that afterimages persist
for longer in older people in the typical population (Kline
and Nestor 1977) but whether the intensity of color after-
images changes with age is unknown. Further studies
investigating adaptation in both the typical and autistic
populations at different stages in development for a range
of perceptual domains are needed to fully examine the
question of whether age affects the intensity of adaptation
afterimages.
Since we found no difference in adaptation, we fail to
support the suggestion of suppressed retinal activity in the
retina of autistic individuals, at least in adults (Ritvo et al.
1988). Likewise, there is no evidence that the purported
differences in chromatic discrimination in autistic indi-
viduals (Cranwell et al. 2015; Franklin et al. 2008; Fujita
et al. 2011; Heaton et al. 2008) has any effects on the
responses made on this task. While it is the case that poorer
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discrimination may lead to more variability in achromatic
settings, it is unlikely that this would represent a systematic
shift of responses. Furthermore, differences in chromatic
discrimination do not necessarily imply differences in
adaptation. Finally, in adults, differences in chromatic
discrimination may be associated with non-verbal ability
[at least when measured using the Farnsworth-Munsell
100-Hue Test (FM100) (Cranwell et al. 2015)], whereas
our groups are matched for Perceptual Reasoning Index
(PRI), the non-verbal sub-scale of the WASI-II (see
Table 1). The present study, it should be noted, cannot
contribute to the question of chromatic discrimination in
autism since the measure used is likely to be relatively
insensitive and there are competing task demands related to
nulling the adaptation afterimage.
The data from the present study show typical color
adaptation in a group of autistic adults, contrasting to
evidence for attenuated adaptation in other domains asso-
ciated with autism in children. This may be due to the
lower-level sensory nature of color adaptation compared to
those domains in which adaptation has been shown to be
attenuated in autism, or due to developmental changes in
adaptation between childhood and adulthood. Further
research should seek to clarify the role of top-down
knowledge on color adaptation in both children and adults
with and without autism. Another potentially fruitful
approach may be to measure multiple forms of adaptation
(e.g. color, motion, faces etc.), with the same task and
procedure for each stimulus domain, within individuals in
order to compare adaptation across domains and levels of
representation.
Top-Down Effects on Afterimages
Our secondary hypothesis related to a possible effect of
scene content on color adaptation. Lupyan (2015) proposed
that there are top-down effects of knowledge of a scene on
the strength of adaptation and that natural scenes therefore
have stronger afterimages than man-made scenes, which
are not color diagnostic. While we observed that natural
scenes elicited stronger afterimages than man-made scenes,
and this effect was similarly strong across groups, we
nevertheless failed to replicate Lupyan’s finding of an
interaction of this effect with the orientation of the image.
This interaction between orientation and image content is
crucial to claims of top-down knowledge affecting after-
image magnitude, since effects of image content alone may
be attributed to low-level properties of the different
adapting images (greater luminance or chromatic inten-
sity). Afterimages in our study were of equivalent strength
regardless of whether the adapting image was upright or
upside down. This lack of an interaction suggests that the
difference in adaptation for type of scene may well be due
to low-level differences in the images (e.g., chroma) rather
than top-down effects of color diagnostic scene content.
The lack of a verified top-down effect on color adaptation
in our study means that, unfortunately, we are unable to
determine whether effects of knowledge on adaptation are
reduced in autistic adults, since we do not find such effects
in the group of typical adults.
The failure to replicate Lupyan’s (2015) top-down effect
may be due to a number of factors. The method and the
stimuli were very similar to Lupyan’s and the samples were
of a similar age (early adulthood). Nevertheless there were
some methodological differences between studies, which
may help explain the discrepancy between the findings.
First, the after-effect was measured in different units across
studies. Specifically, we quantified the after-effect using
the perceptually meaningful measure of chroma rather than
units in computational HSL space. However, when we
analyzed our results in terms of HSL steps, we still found
no effect of orientation and no orientation-diagnosticity
interaction.
Second, Lupyan’s diagnosticity-orientation interaction
was derived from comparing participants from different
experiments, and therefore, different participants, while in
our study all participants completed all conditions. Seeing
both upright and inverted images within one experiment,
even if the images are different, could weaken the extent
to which the observer views the upright images as a
meaningful scene, and/or facilitate the interpretation of
upside-down images leading to some top-down effects.
Either of these possibilities would lead to a reduction in
the strength of the interaction between image content and
orientation. If this is true, top-down effects of knowledge
may have been weaker in our study than Lupyan’s
because of our within-subjects rather than between-groups
manipulation of orientation. Notwithstanding, we feel that
the within-subjects design of our study is preferable, since
it avoids the possibility of cohort effects, where one group
happens to have stronger afterimages than the other, and
has greater power by virtue of being based on within-
participant factors.
Third, the average time taken for participants to make
the nulling adjustment is another potential factor. In the
present study, we found no relationship between mean
response times and the mean measured afterimage magni-
tudes (i.e. mean response times to all conditions are simi-
lar, see results). Lupyan (2015) reported an average
adjustment time of just under 10 s, while our participants
appear to have made their adjustments more rapidly, the
average adjustment taking around 6 s. With time, the
strength of the afterimage fades (e.g., Kline and Nestor
1977), it is therefore likely that Lupyan’s (2015) partici-
pants were making their achromatic settings for relatively
weaker afterimages, compared to the participants in the
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present study. It is possible that these effects are somewhat
sensitive to the time-course of adaptation—perhaps being
more likely to be evident when the observer is adjusting to
null a less intense afterimage (later) than when the after-
image is stronger (earlier). A weaker afterimage may cause
the observer to be less certain of the bottom-up sensory
input, and thus more likely to rely on top-down information
in making their judgment.
Further research into these factors (within-participant
orientation manipulations and response time) may help to
clarify whether these aspects of the task design are crucial
to identifying top-down effects. However, if it is to gen-
erate further interesting and testable research questions
about top-down effects on visual perception, the effect
should be generalizable beyond the specific parameters of
the original study, to other stimuli, paradigms and designs.
Our study adds a somewhat cautious view of the general-
izability of Lupyan’s effect.
Finally, it is important to note that the Bayesian analysis
confirms that the data provide only ‘weak’ (Dienes 2011;
Raftery 1999) support for the null hypothesis relating to
main effects of orientation and image type and the inter-
action between these factors. Considering Fig. 3, the
aggregate data do appear to tend towards the expected
direction of the effect—afterimage intensity is reduced by
turning the image upside down to a greater extent for the
diagnostic scenes than for the non-diagnostic. However,
this trend does not appear at the individual level, with only
a few participants’ individual data revealing this expected
pattern. It appears from our study that the effect of top-
down knowledge of afterimage strength, if present, is rel-
atively subtle (see also Hansen et al. 2006; Olkkonen et al.
2008). The present task may not be the most sensitive test
of these effects, and an alternative task which evokes
stronger and more reliable effects should be sought to
better test predictions relating to top-down influences on
perception.
Other studies have shown the effect of prior knowledge
or expectation on visual perception. An auditory label
which is congruent with an image otherwise suppressed
from visual awareness by inter-ocular rivalry can improve
detection speed and sensitivity, and is specific to the object
(e.g. hearing ‘‘pumpkin’’ speeds detection of pumpkins but
not chairs) (Lupyan and Ward 2013). Similarly, when
asked to adjust a familiar and prototypically-colored object
to grayscale, observers appear to overcompensate for the
influence of memory colors. For example, observers’
grayscale settings for a banana tend to be slightly biased in
the blue direction, apparently to counteract the influence of
the yellow memory color (Hansen et al. 2006; Olkkonen
et al. 2008), although some of these top-down effects are
notably small. As such, the brain appears to use prior
experience of familiar objects with distinct colors to
predictively code their appearance (Bannert and Bartels
2013). If such effects reflect top-down modulation of the
cortical representation of those objects through the appli-
cation of priors to current percepts, then we should find
individual differences in the strength of these effects
depending on autism symptomatology, age and experience
with the objects in question. In order to fully explore this
possibility, however, one must first find a perceptual task
for which a reliable effect of top-down knowledge can be
demonstrated in a typical group.
Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to show that there
were no differences between autistic adults and typical
adults in the overall strength of adaptation afterimage in
this task. This study therefore provides evidence for typical
color adaptation in autism. Unfortunately, we were unable
to address fully the secondary hypothesis regarding the role
of top-down knowledge on perception in autism, due to the
failure to replicate the top-down effects on afterimage
strength in this task reported by Lupyan (2015).
The present study is the first to demonstrate typical color
adaptation in a sample of autistic adults, and is contrary to
the evidence for attenuated adaptation in other domains of
visual perception (Ewing et al. 2013a, b; Fiorentini et al.
2012; Pellicano et al. 2013; Rhodes et al. 2014; Turi et al.
2015). We suggest that this may be due to the early level at
which color adaptation occurs and/or developmental
changes in adaptation.
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